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Summary
Among the second-best approaches for the regulation of pollution, little attention has
been paid to the distorting effect of intensive margin policies on the extensive margin.
This article shows, within a dynamic framework, that regulation of the intensive
margin has to be complemented by regulation of the extensive margin. Depending
on the elasticity of the pollution function with respect to nitrogen use, the appropriate
regulation at the extensive margin is zero, a tax or a subsidy. We show empirically that
combining a nitrogen tax with land-use taxes is about 18 per cent more cost efficient
than a nitrogen tax alone and 58 per cent more efficient than off-site abatement in the
form of groundwater treatment.
Keywords: cost efficiency, second-best policies, nitrate leaching, intensive and
extensive margin, dynamic optimisation
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1. Introduction
Non-point source pollution is a major concern for both developed and devel-
oping countries. Although there is general agreement among administrations,
politicians, scientists and non-profit organisations that more effective
measures have to be implemented (World Resources Institute, 2000; World-
watch Institute, 2001), no consensus has been reached about what kind of
action should be taken. Unfortunately, the economic literature does not
provide a clear answer to this question either.
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The difficulties in designing policies reside in several features of non-point
source pollution (Wu and Babcock, 2001). Firstly, emissions-based instru-
ments cannot be employed as discharges cannot be metered with a reasonable
degree of accuracy at an acceptable cost. Secondly, non-point emissions
and their consequences are highly stochastic. Thirdly, land and firm
characteristics vary.
Ambient taxes have been proposed as a response to the first characteristic
(Segerson, 1988; Xepapadeas, 1991, 1992). Although this approach has a
strong appeal, its political acceptability may be severely limited as there is
no direct relationship between current individual behaviour and the size of
the actual fine (Shortle and Abler, 1998). Accordingly, a second approach in
the economic literature focuses on indirect instruments that aim to control
pollution indirectly; for instance, instruments that regulate inputs or manage-
ment practices of the firm. However, to be applicable, regulations of inputs or
management practices have to be limited to a subset of choices that are
both easy to observe and highly correlated with emissions of the pollutant.
Therefore, this type of regulation is only a second-best option.
The economic literature has analysed the optimal management of nitrate
leaching from agricultural production within a static or dynamic context,
depending on whether the nitrate enters surface water or accumulates in the
groundwater. However, the literature seems to be incomplete because, to
our best knowledge, no paper comparing different policy options has ever
taken into account the fact that nitrate emissions from agricultural land
depend to a great extent on the evolution of the nitrogen pool of the soil
over time.
Moreover, apart from an article by Yadav (1997), in taking the choice of
optimal crops into account, previous studies have limited the choice to a
very small number of exogenously pre-specified sets of crop rotations.
Farmers are only allowed to choose from among those rotations, implying
that multiple-year decisions are made at a single point in time. In this case,
the choice of crops cannot be considered a true decision. In contrast, our
model does not rely on exogenously pre-specified crop mixes and therefore
crop rotations arise endogenously. Consideration of the nitrogen pool
allowed us to include the choice of crop as a true decision variable because
it takes account of the preceding crop effect.
Among the second-best regulation of inputs, little attention has been paid to
the choice of inputs to be regulated. Studies such as Mapp et al. (1994), Larson
et al. (1996) and Vickner et al. (1998) have analysed the environmental and
economic impact of regulating a contaminating input, either by the choice
of the input itself and/or by a change in the applied technology. In an excellent
paper providing an overview of the state of the art in non-point source pol-
lution control, Shortle et al. (1998) determined the optimal design of different
input policies when the set of regulated inputs is a subset of all input choices.
To determine the optimal, yet static, input policy, Shortle et al., took into
account that a change in intensity of one input affects the intensity of all
other inputs. Thus, the derived optimal policy is a function of all regulated
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and unregulated inputs. However, the optimal design of input policies affecting
only the intensive margin is not adequate for the optimal design of input
policies involving intensive and extensive margins. In this paper, the term
extensive margin refers to the size of the area of a particular crop and not
the total area of cultivated land.
This paper shows that the optimal policy with respect to the extensive
margin is not only a function of all inputs, but also depends on the optimal
policy instruments of the inputs affecting the intensive margin. Therefore,
this article analytically specifies second-best policies that regulate the inten-
sive and extensive margins simultaneously within a completely dynamic
setting. In addition to the analytical work, we present the results of an empiri-
cal study in which we analysed and determined the relative efficiency gains
resulting from simultaneous regulation of the intensive and extensive
margins for an aquifer situated within the area of the watershed of Lake
Baldegg in Switzerland.
We consider the case of nitrate leaching into the groundwater as a result
of agricultural activities. In contrast to previous empirical studies, the
extensive margin, as defined above and given by the size of the share of
each production activity in the product mix, is not restricted to a pre-specified
set of production activities. Thus, we are able to analyse whether regulating
the production intensity in the form of a nitrogen-input tax or the extension
of production activities in the form of a land-use tax are equally efficient on
their own, or whether they have to be complemented by each other. In this
way we can answer the question about the cost efficient mix of policies at
the extensive and intensive margins within a dynamic context. The dynamic
context is required not only because the pollutant may be stored temporarily
in the nitrogen pool of the soil and finally accumulated at the receptor, but
also because we consider the choice of crop to be a true decision variable.
Moreover, the article compares the abatement cost of these two measures
with the cost of water treatment at the receptor of the contaminated water,
thereby determining the relative efficiency of on-site versus off-site abatement.
Our results show that regulating the intensive margin has to be complemen-
ted by regulating the extensive margin. Depending on the responsiveness of
the pollution function as a result of a change in the use of nitrogen fertilisers
(intensive margin), a tax on the nitrogen content of mineral fertilisers has to be
complemented by a mixture of subsidies and taxes related to land-use. The use
of both instruments is necessary when nitrogen contamination depends not
only on the total amount of nitrogen used, but also on the specific crops to
which it is applied, because for any given application amount different
crops imply different uptake and hence different amounts of leaching to the
groundwater. Although the tax on nitrogen use can account for the impact
of total use, it cannot account for the impact of crop type unless it is
differentiated by crop. To correct the distortion in the crop choice that
continues to exist after the nitrogen tax is applied, a crop-specific land-use
tax must be used. It should be noted that the utilised framework for the
economic analysis is dynamic as a result of the nature of the problem analysed.
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However, the complementation of a regulation at the intensive margin by a
regulation at the extensive margin would also be required if the problem
itself were static.
2. The economic model
To achieve efficiency, the social net benefit of agricultural production and
consumers’ net benefits are maximised over calendar time t, t [ [0,T ].
Agricultural production takes place within a catchment area that feeds a
single cell aquifer. The aquifer has a constant water balance and is contami-
nated with nitrate from agricultural production. However, our analysis does
not consider the entire catchment area but rather an area the size of a single
farm. The characteristics of this farm are representative of agricultural
production within the catchment area. Consequently, the volume of the
aquifer analysed is chosen such that it corresponds to the original volume of
the aquifer divided by the number of hectares of the farm. The decision
variables are the amount and type of fertiliser j ( j ¼ 1 mineral, or j ¼ 2
organic) and the choice of crops (activities) i, (i ¼ 1, . . . , I ). If a crop can
be cultivated either by minimum tillage or by conventional tillage, they are
considered as different activities. Given the regional focus of the analysis,
the nationally determined market prices are not influenced by production
decisions taken within the region. Thus, consumers’ utility is unaffected by
production decisions with respect to prices but it is affected as far as the
level of nitrate in the aquifer is concerned. Hence, the dynamic economic
decision problem can be formulated as:
max
xijðtÞ;yijðtÞ
ðT
0
XI
i¼1
X2
j¼1
h
ð pi fijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞ  ajxijðtÞ  ci fijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞ  kijÞyijðtÞ
 cðsðtÞÞ
i
ed t dt þ ed TzðnðTÞ; sðTÞÞ ð1Þ
subject to
_s ¼
XI
i¼1
X2
j¼1
gijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞyijðtÞ; sð0Þ ¼ s0 ð2Þ
_n ¼
PI
i¼1
P2
j¼1 fijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞyijðtÞPI
i¼1
P2
j¼1 yijðtÞ
; nð0Þ ¼ n0 ð3Þ
xijðtÞ  0; yij [ Y; i ¼ 1; . . . ; I; j ¼ 1; 2; Y , <I ð4Þ
where i, i ¼ 1, . . . , I denotes the crop (activity), t the time, and T the final point
in time of the planning horizon. Index j, j ¼ 1, 2, indicates mineral and organic
fertiliser respectively.
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The model uses the following parameters:
pi price of crop i (CHF
1/dt),
aj price of fertiliser j (CHF/kg),
ci costs of crop i that are related to the yield (harvest cost, drying cost, etc.)
(CHF per ton),
kij fixed cost per hectare of crop i (capital, labour and costs that vary with the
type of the applied fertiliser) (CHF),
d discount rate,
Y set of constraints (i) on admissible crop rotations with respect to yij, (ii) on
the total amount of available land and (iii) on the non-negativity of the
choice variables;
Variables:
xij(t) fertiliser j applied per hectare for crop i (kg),
yij(t) hectare of cultivated land with crop i, utilising fertiliser j,
n(t) average amount of nitrogen in the nitrogen pool in the soil per hectare
(kg/ha),
s(t) amount of nitrate in the groundwater (kg), and
Functions:
fij production of crop i per hectare as a function of the amount and type of
fertiliser j and the nitrogen pool, with fx . 0 and fn. 0 for all i, j (dt/ha),
gij leaching of nitrate per hectare into the groundwater as a function of the
amount and type of fertiliser j and the nitrogen pool, with gx . 0 and
gn . 0 for all i, j (kg/ha),
fij change in the amount of nitrogen in the nitrogen pool as a function of the
amount and type of fertiliser j and the nitrogen pool, with fx . 0 and
fn, 0 for all i, j (kg/ha),
c monetary damages as a result of the amount of nitrate in the ground-
water2 and the volume of groundwater, with c 0  0 (CHF),
z terminal value as a function of the amount of nitrogen in the nitrogen pool
and the nitrate concentration in the groundwater evaluated at the terminal
point of time, with zn . 0 and zs. 0 (CHF),
where a subscript of function with respect to a variable indicates the partial
derivative of the function regarding this variable, and a dot over a variable
indicates the operator d/dt. The formulation of the model presented will
be modified later to incorporate different policy instruments analysed in the
empirical part of the paper.
The model exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to land, in line with
the previous literature in this field (see Claassen and Horan, 2001: 8). The
1 1 CHF (Swiss Franc) ¼ E0.617 in 1999, our base year.
2 We assume that consumers’ utility is quasi-linear with respect to the traded goods and externality.
Thus, the optimal level of externality is independent of the consumers’ expenditures, and it is
possible to derive a utility function that depends only on the externality s(t) (Mas-Colell et al.,
1995). It is given by c(s(t)).
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leaching function gij is on a per hectare basis, and thus, the differential
equation (2) describes the change in the amount of nitrate in the groundwater
as a function of the nitrate emission of the entire cultivated land. According to
the existing literature (Mapp et al., 1994; Yiridoe and Weersink, 1998), the
nitrate leaching function is crop-specific and depends on the amount and
type of fertiliser j and the nitrogen pool n. The differential equation (3)
describes the average change of nitrogen in the nitrogen pool of the soil.
Because the change in the amount of nitrogen in the nitrogen pool fij is
defined on a per hectare basis, the average change in the amount of nitrogen
of one cultivated hectare is obtained by weighting fij with the share of
each crop within the crop rotation, i.e. by yij/
P
i¼1
I P
j¼1
2 yij. The definition
of n(t) on a per hectare basis is necessary as this state variable enters the pro-
duction and leaching functions that are defined per ha. Restriction (4) puts
non-negativity constraints on the decision variable xij and summarises
further restrictions with respect to yij, such as non-negativity, the total
amount of available farm land and crop rotation constraints.
The mathematical model presented by equations (1)–(4) does not require
the specification of a particular crop rotation beforehand. The model is formu-
lated in such a way that the choice of each crop itself is considered as a
decision variable. To take account of the preceding crop effect, which is of
great importance for the correct determination of the optimal crop rotation,
it was necessary to incorporate a variable that captures the preceding
crop effect and passes it on to the next crop within the crop rotation.
Considering the nitrogen pool as a stock variable serves this purpose precisely
and allows the preceding crop and its significance for the subsequent
crop within the crop rotation to be taken into account. Thus, the inclusion
of the two stock variables (s(t), n(t)) permits us to take account of nitrate
leaching from the nitrogen pool of the soil, the accumulation of nitrate at
the aquifer and the endogenous determination of the optimal crop rotation
over time.
3. Design of policies
The current Hamiltonian value for the social problem can be written as
H ¼
XI
i¼1
X2
j¼1
ð pi fijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞ  aj xijðtÞ  ci fijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞ  kijÞyijðtÞ
 cðsðtÞÞ þ lðtÞ
XI
i¼1
X2
j¼1
gijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞyijðtÞ
þ mðtÞ
PI
i¼1
P2
j¼1 fijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞyijðtÞPI
i¼1
P2
j¼1 yijðtÞ
: ð5Þ
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By taking into account the constraints formulated in (4), the Hamiltonian is
transformed into the Lagrangian function, L. Because the constraints do not
influence the results presented later, we do not present the Lagrangian func-
tion. The first-order conditions for a maximum of the Lagrangian function
and the corresponding transversality conditions are presented and discussed
in Section A1 of the Appendix.
Given that, for technical or economic reasons, the regulator cannot observe
the individual emissions of the polluters, the regulator is left with second-best
instruments. Because of the focus of this article, the following analysis con-
centrates on second-best policies for the extensive and intensive margins.
Moreover, to simplify the notation the argument t is suppressed in the remain-
ing part of the paper unless it is required for an unambiguous notation.
A private decision-maker does not take nitrate leaching into account and
thus the economic damage of the nitrate concentration in the groundwater,
c(s), is not considered. We assume that the regulator considers the imposition
of an input tax tij on the amount of nitrogen xij applied (regulation at the inten-
sive margin) and the imposition of a land-use tax sij per hectare differentiated
according to the cultivated crop (activity) i and the type of fertiliser j (regu-
lation at the extensive margin). Given these taxes the Hamiltonian of the
private decision problem Hp is given by
Hp ¼
XI
i¼1
X2
j¼1
pi fij xij; n
  aj xij  ci fij xij; n  kij  tijxij  sij yij
þ m
PI
i¼1
P2
j¼1 fijðxij; nÞyijPI
i¼1
P2
j¼1 yij
: ð6Þ
The constraints formulated in (4) that already form part of the social problem
also apply identically to the private problem. Thus, the private Hamiltonian
is transformed into the private Lagrangian function Lp. The first-order con-
ditions of the private decision problem are presented in Section A2 of the
Appendix.
A comparison of the first-order conditions for the social problem (12)–(17)
(see Appendix) with the first-order conditions of the private problem
(19)–(22) (see Appendix) suggests that the time-dependent nitrogen input
tax tij(t) is given by
tijðtÞ ¼ lgijxðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞ: ð7Þ
To determine the sign of tij we first need to determine the sign of l(t) by
solving equation (16). Making use of the transversality conditions (18)
allows the following particular solution of equation (16) to be obtained:
lðtÞ ¼ edðtTÞzsðnðTÞ; sðTÞÞ  ed t
ðT
t
c 0ðsðuÞedu du , 0 ð8Þ
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where an asterisk indicates the evaluation of the variable at its optimal value.
Hence, the nitrogen input tax tij is always positive and therefore it is always a
proper tax. To analyse the time-dependent land-use tax sij(t), we distinguish
between the case where the regulator has not imposed a nitrogen input tax
and the case where a nitrogen input tax has been imposed. In the first case,
where tij(t) is equal to zero, we obtain from equations (13) and (20) the follow-
ing equation:
sijðtÞ ¼ lðtÞgijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞ  0: ð9Þ
In the second case, where a nitrogen input tax is present, equations (13) and
(20) yield the following equation:
sijðtÞ ¼ tijxijðtÞ  lðtÞgijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞ ., 0: ð10Þ
Defining the pollution elasticity, 1x
gij, as
1gijx ¼
@gijðxijnÞ
@xij
xij
gij
. 0
the land-use tax can be written as
sijðtÞ ¼ lðtÞgijðxijðtÞ; nðtÞÞð1gijx  1Þ ., 0: ð11Þ
A comparison of equations (9) and (10) shows that they differ by the term in
the pollution elasticity. According to equation (9), the land-use tax as a single
instrument will either be zero or a proper tax. However, if a nitrogen input tax
is present, equation (11) shows that the land-use tax sij is positive, leading to a
proper tax, if the pollution elasticity is smaller than one. If the pollution elas-
ticity is greater than one, the land-use tax will be negative, leading to a land-
use subsidy.
Equations (9) and (10) also illustrate the difference in the optimal design of
policies affecting the intensive and/or extensive margin. Equation (9) shows
that the optimal nitrogen input tax depends on the input affecting the intensive
margin whereas equation (10) reveals that the optimal land-use tax depends
not only on the input but also on the tax on the input affecting the intensive
margin. The intuition behind this result is that a tax on land-use is a tax
where the farmer already had to pay taxes on the inputs affecting the intensive
margin. This double payment has to be corrected so that the land-use tax cor-
responds to the difference between what the farmer had to pay per hectare and
what he already paid per hectare in the form of other input taxes. A single tax
on the input affecting the intensive margin establishes the socially optimal
intensity but affects each crop differently. Consequently, it distorts the socially
optimal crop mix and the imposition of a land-use tax/subsidy is necessary to
correct this distortion.
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The previous results require information about the value of the pollution
elasticity. When the pollution elasticity is not known, the following
proposition helps to determine the sign of the land-use tax.
Proposition 1
(a) If the pollution function gij is strictly convex in the amount of applied
nitrogen xij, and if the amount of applied nitrogen xij is essential for the
leaching of nitrate, i.e. gij (0, n
) ¼ 0, i.e. the background load is zero,
the land-use tax is a subsidy for the crop yij.
(b) If the pollution function gij is strictly concave in the amount of applied
nitrogen xij, the land-use tax is a tax for the crop yij.
(c) If the pollution function gij is linear in the amount of applied nitrogen xij,
and if the amount of applied nitrogen xij is essential for the leaching of
nitrate, i.e. gij (0, n
) ¼ 0, the land-use tax for the crop yij is zero.
The proof is presented in Section A3 of the Appendix. According to our
previous results, Proposition 1c shows that if the pollution function is linear
in the amount of applied nitrogen, then a tax on input is equivalent to a tax
on emissions, and therefore no regulation is needed at the extensive margin.3
The proposed time-dependent taxes are differentiated by the cultivated crop
and the type of fertiliser applied. Thus, their actual imposition requires that the
regulator is able to observe these characteristics. However, as shown below in
the empirical section, the taxes can be simplified and still maintain their effects
on the intensive and extensive margins.
4. An empirical study
The previous section demonstrated the need for accompanying regulation at
the intensive margin by regulation at the extensive margin. Although it
offers theoretical insight, it does not show the magnitude of the efficiency
gain resulting from joint regulation. Therefore, this section provides an
empirical study to determine the magnitude of the gain in efficiency based
on the theoretical model presented above. The area of the empirical study cor-
responds to the catchment area of an aquifer situated in the watershed of Lake
Baldegg, Switzerland, where nitrate leaching has severely affected the ground-
water. The specified farm model presents a farm in the area with 20 ha of
arable land (Eidgeno¨ssische Forschungsanstalt fu¨r Landwirtschaftlichen
Pflanzenbau, 1983; Schudel et al., 1991), which is typical with respect to
the size, biophysical data and the available crops for cultivation. The planning
horizon of the farmer is assumed to span 30 years, i.e. T ¼ 30 years.
Numerical solution of the mathematical model (equations (1)–(4)) required
the functions and parameters to be specified. The functions fij(.), gij(.), and
3 Likewise, as noted by one of the reviewers, no regulation at the extensive margin is necessary if
fertiliser is a common pool input, i.e. the production and the leaching functions are not crop-
specific.
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fij(.) were estimated utilising biophysical data, which were previously gener-
ated with a process-oriented biophysical model (Erosion Productivity Impact
Calculator, EPIC).4 The EPIC model is able to reproduce the biophysical pro-
cesses in the soil and the process of plant growth as a function of cultivation
techniques and weather. It consists of different sub-models that are sequen-
tially and interactively connected. For the weather sub-model a so-called
weather generator is available, which allows the weather to be simulated
according to previously fixed design parameters. The EPIC model was
calibrated to reflect local conditions in line with our experience in previous
studies (Maurer et al., 1995; Schaub et al., 1998). The actual data generation
or simulation was carried out for each individual crop i and each fertilisation
regime j, a set of biophysical characteristics (soil type, etc.), weather
conditions and cultivation techniques. Regarding weather conditions, a wet,
normal and dry year were chosen. However, the total amount of precipitation
in a year does not take into account its distribution over the year. Hence, as a
proxy for the amount of precipitation and its distribution we chose the distri-
bution function of soil loss, as it depends on the amount and the annual distri-
bution of the precipitation. The distribution function of soil loss was taken
from an earlier study by Maurer et al. (1995). To reflect the non-symmetry
of the distribution function of soil loss, the average values for the lower 35
per cent (wet year), for the middle 50 per cent (normal year) and for the
upper 15 per cent (dry year) of the distribution function were determined.
The three sets of weather conditions that produced these erosion events
were selected and utilised for the operation of the weather generator of EPIC.5
Prior to use, EPIC requires the amount of nitrogen in the soil to be specified.
Unfortunately, EPIC does not calculate the change in nitrogen in the pool as a
result of different agricultural activities, and of specifically chosen fertilisation
intensities. However, it does allow us to estimate the changes in the nitrogen
pool as a residual value of variables such as: HMN, mineralised nitrogen from
organic material; YNO3, superficial NO3
2 (nitrate) runoff; PRKN, NO3
2 leach-
ing; SSFN, lateral NO3
2 runoff; AVOL, volatilisation of nitrogen in the form of
NH3
2 N (nitrogen in form of ammonia); DORNST, change in the nitrogen
concentration of the stable pool of the soil; UNO3, nitrogen uptake by the
plant; and, finally, the amount of N fertiliser applied. Based on this nitrogen
balance, it is possible to obtain values for n that correspond to specific agricul-
tural activities and to particular fertilisation intensity levels.
Various functional forms such as von Liebig, Mitscherlich-Baule, poly-
nomial square root, Cobb Douglas or Spillmann could be used to specify
4 For more details, see the documentation of the EPIC model (Sharpley and Williams, 1990a, 1990b).
5 For each set of weather conditions, we simulated the yields, nitrate emissions and changes in the
amount of nitrogen in the nitrogen pool. Their expected values were obtained by calculating the
sum of the simulated yields, the sum of nitrate emissions, and the sum of changes in the amount
of nitrogen in the nitrogen pool, each of them weighted with the probabilities of the event of these
weather conditions. The expected values of yields, nitrate emissions, and changes in the amount
of nitrogen in the nitrogen pool were then employed as the dependent variable to estimate the
functions fij, gij, and fij.
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the production function fij(.). Currently, there is no particular form of the pro-
duction function that is unanimously considered to be superior to alternative
specifications. Fuchs and Lo¨the (1998), for instance, compared the quadratic,
square root, Mitscherlich, von Liebig and the Cobb Douglas functions.
According to their results, the specification of the production function as a
second-degree polynomial is the best way to model the input/output response
with respect to fertiliser. Ackello-Ogutu et al. (1985) reported that the
von Liebig function performed better in modelling crop growth than poly-
nomial functions. However, Frank et al. (1990) concluded from a comparison
of the Quadratic, von Liebig and Mitscherlich functions that the ‘law of
minimum’, as proposed by von Liebig, cannot generally be accepted. In
light of these somewhat contradictory results, we specified the production
function as a quadratic function, as adopting a von Liebig function may
have caused difficulties in obtaining a numerical solution. Likewise, the
data generated showed that the functions describing gij and the change in
the amount of nitrogen in the nitrogen pool fij were best represented by a
quadratic function. Moreover, the specification of the leaching function is in
line with the results of Yiridoe and Weersink (1998).
The parameters of the functions fij, gij, and fij were estimated using the
nonlinear least-squared regression procedure in EViews (Quantitative Micro
Software, 1998). Before estimating, the functions were written in logarithmic
form so that what matters are the relative, and not the absolute, deviations of
the estimated value from the observed value (Greene, 2000).
As an alternative to the procedure described in this paper for estimating the
functions fij(.), gij(.), and fij(.), one could consider an approach using only
observed empirical data. However, this approach would be problematic
because the data are often not available or the existing time series do not
allow isolation without causing ambiguity between endogenous variables
and exogenous variables of interest (Goetz et al., 1998). Moreover, observed
empirical data are generated conditional on policies employed during the
period of observation. Thus, the use of observed empirical data may
exclude the economic evaluation of new policies.
With respect to choice of crops, the farmer can choose between potatoes
(conventional tillage), maize (conventional tillage with or without a cover
crop during winter, or minimum tillage), winter wheat (conventional or
minimum tillage), winter barley (conventional or minimum tillage), oats
(conventional with or without a cover crop during winter or minimum
tillage) and annual or biennial grassland. Thus, the number of activities I is
equal to 13. As the choice of crop is endogenous in the economic model,
each crop was simulated independently from the other crops over a time
span of 1 year. This short simulation period, however, does not take into
account the preceding crop effect, which is of great importance for the
endogenous determination of the optimal crop rotation. To incorporate the
preceding crop effect and to pass it on to the next crop within the crop rotation,
we included the nitrogen pool of the soil in the mathematical model.
Thus, the dynamic context of the model together with the nitrogen pool
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allow the optimal crop rotation to be determined over time, although the
estimated and employed functions fij, gij, and fij were estimated on a 1 year
basis.
According to the mathematical model and given the set of alternatively
specified EPIC parameters, one obtains 3,120 simulated processes of
growth, leaching and nitrogen pool movement, which are available for the
estimation of the functions fij, gij, and fj. For instance, if one employs for
one crop two different types of fertilisers and three different weather
conditions, the total number of simulated biophysical process is six.
Overall, we have 13 crops  2 types of fertiliser  3 weather conditions  5
levels of nitrogen in the nitrogen pools8 application rates for the nitrogen
fertiliser (¼3,120). It was possible to slightly reduce the number of simu-
lations, as not all crops can be combined with the two types of fertiliser and
the types of tillage. Nevertheless, each simulation generates a very large set
of data (1.5 Mbytes), which requires careful data management.
As the model relates to a single cell aquifer, equation (2) had to be specified
correctly to reflect the hydrological conditions of the aquifer. Moreover,
in contrast to our previous definition, equation (2) is now expressed in
mg/l instead of kg. (For details, see Section A4 of the Appendix.) Further-
more, a discount rate of d ¼ 0.03, a depth of the single cell aquifer of
h ¼ 10,000 mm, and an initial value of the nitrate concentration of the ground-
water of s0 ¼ 46 mg NO32 mg/l were chosen to specify the parameters of the
model formed by equations (1)–(4). The parameter value of the initial value of
the nitrogen pool in the soil n0 was set equal to 8364 g N/1,000 kg soil, which
is a representative value for the soil found in the region analysed (Maurer
et al., 1995; Schaub et al., 1998). The remaining parameters pi, aj, ci, kij of
the model were determined based on data published annually by an extension
service (LBL, 1998–1999). Additionally, we have considered a set of crop
restrictions as they correspond to common agricultural practice expressed as
yij [ Y. After completing the specification of the functions and parameters,
the economic decision problem was programmed in AMPL (Algebraic Mod-
eling Programming Language) (Fourer et al., 1999) and solved with the solver
MINOS (Murtagh and Saunders, 1995).
The processes of the different components of the model that we have
described and the relationships between them are presented schematically in
Figure 1, which illustrates both the temporal sequence and the interaction of
the different components of the model.
5. Results
Given that the damage function c(s) is often not well known, the socially
optimal level of pollution cannot be determined. Consequently, the designed
policy instruments are not able to establish the optimal outcome. Therefore,
the objective of the empirical study is to compare the relative efficiency of
different policy instruments or, in other words, to produce a ranking with
respect to the abatement cost of the different policy instruments, given a
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certain nitrate concentration in the aquifer. Other costs related to the different
policies, such as transaction, administration, control and enforcement costs,
are also important; however, they are not included in this analysis. The
selected nitrate concentration for the comparison of the different policy
instruments was chosen so that it would be an intermediate outcome of the
three policy options analysed.
Initially, we calculated a base case, i.e. the optimal solution of the
mathematical model formulated in equations (1)–(4), where the damage
function is zero and no policy is in place. In the base case, nitrate leaching
does not have any financial consequences. Because the evaluation of the
base case and of the different policies always includes a time horizon of 30
years, and all monetary values are discounted, we have presented the results
of the empirical part of the article in the form of average discounted values,
to shorten the presentation. For the base case we obtain average farm net
benefits of 1174 CHF/ha and the nitrate concentration of the aquifer settles
at 46 mg/l in the long run. Hence, the choice of an initial value of the
nitrate concentration of the groundwater of 46 mg/l allows the effect of the
policy instruments on the average nitrate concentration of the groundwater
to be isolated and eliminates the distorting effect of an initial value of the
nitrate concentration that is different from the long-run equilibrium.
To take account of each of the three formulated policies, the mathematical
model is adapted accordingly. In particular, the damage function is eliminated
and the three policy instruments in the form of water treatment costs, a
Figure 1. Components of the model and scheme of the economic analysis.
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nitrogen input tax and the combination of a land-use tax and nitrogen input tax
are successively put in place.
5.1. Water treatment
The water treatment costs of the extracted water from the aquifer are
measured by the costs incurred to comply with Swiss law, which stipulates
a target value of 25 NO3
2 mg/l and a minimum standard of 40 NO3
2 mg/l
(Bundesamt fu¨r Umwelt Wald und Landschaft, 1998). Based on the literature
(in particular, Rohmann and Sontheimer (1985), Weingarten (1996) and Fuchs
and Lo¨the (1998)), we adopt a water treatment cost function, v(s), given by
v(s) ¼ w(s2 25), where w takes values between 0.002 and 0.01 CHF. Thus,
for a reduction from 50 to 25 mg/l and for w ¼ 0.002 CHF, we obtain a treat-
ment cost of 0.05 CHF/m3 of extracted water.6 These values fall within the
range of the water treatment costs found in the literature mentioned above.
Because the water balance of the aquifer is constant, the amount of treated
water does not vary from year to year, and therefore, the water treatment
costs vary only with the nitrate concentration of the extracted water. The
water treatment costs were incorporated into the mathematical decision
model to determine the resulting level of abatement. Hence, the solution of
the model provides the optimal choice between on-site abatement (farmer)
and off-site abatement (water treatment). We refer to this solution as the
social outcome, which consists of the private net benefits minus the water
treatment costs.
Unfortunately, there are no empirical data to estimate a water treatment
cost function specifically for the region analysed. Therefore, the function
was parameterised and five values of w were considered in the analysis. For
all values of w considered, the resulting nitrate concentration of the aquifer,
s, is above the target value of 25 mg and below the minimum standard of
40 mg of nitrate per litre of water. Table 1 summarises the most important
results of the outcomes of the calculations.
Table 1 shows that the sum of the discounted social net benefits for the
cultivation of 20 ha over 30 years drops from 704,000 CHF to 515,000 CHF
for an increase in the water treatment costs from 0 to 1 Rappen (1 CHF¼ 100
Rappen) per NO3
2 mg/l per m3 of water. Thus, the average social net benefit
of farming over 30 years falls from 1,174 CHF to 1,1742 316.3¼
853.7 CHF/ha. The reduction in the average social net benefits is accompanied
by a reduction in the average NO3
2 concentration in the groundwater over
30 years from 46 mg/l to 462 10.6¼ 35.4 mg/l. Dividing the values of the
6 Foess et al. (1998) compared the cost of different processes applied in the USA to remove biologi-
cal nutrient from water, and reported water treatment costs that range from 1.4 to 21 US$/m3. The
great cost discrepancy between the literature cited in this article and the study by Foess et al., can
be explained in part because the authors considered the cost of nitrate reduction down to 10 mg/l
and independent of the pre-treatment nitrate level. Moreover, the literature cited in this study
assumes that sufficient clean and cheap water is available for mixing with the contaminated
water to reduce the nitrate concentration to the desired level.
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Table 1. Outcomes in the presence of water treatment costs
Outcome Water treatment costs in Rappen (1 Rappen ¼ 0.01 CHF) per NO32 mg/l and m3 of water
0 0.2 0.36 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Sum of the social net benefits of farming
over 30 years for the entire farm
(in 1,000 CHF/20 ha)
704 648 618 611 577 545 515
Changes in the average social net benefits
of farming in CHF/ha (1,174 CHF/ha
with no water treatment cost)a
0 293.4 2144.3 2156.0 2212.5 2265.8 2316.3
(0%) (28%) (212.3%) (213.3%) (218.1%) (222.7%) (227.0%)
Average water treatment cost (CHF/ha) 0 67.1 105.7 116.0 164.1 207.0 245.0
Changes in the average NO3 concentration
in the groundwater in mg/l (46 mg/l with
no water treatment costs)a
0 26.7 28.5 28.7 29.4 210.0 210.6
(0%) (216.2%) (218.5%) (221.3%) (223.0%) (224.5%) (226.0%)
Average abatement and water treatment
costs in CHF per NO3
2 mg/la
0 14 16.9 17.9 22.6 26.5 29.9
Changes in the nitrogen pool in the final year
of the planning horizon in g/ton of soil with
respect to the initial value of 8364 g/ton
259 2885 21079 21208 21382 21367 21284
aThe stated values are the average values over the entire planning horizon of 30 years.
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third line by the values of the fifth line of Table 1, we obtain the average abate-
ment and water treatment cost over 30 years per mg/l NO3
2. Our calculations
show that these costs rise from 0 to 29.9 CHF per NO3
2 mg/l. Moreover, com-
pared with the results of the base case, the introduction of water treatment costs
results in a decrease of the nitrogen pool at the end of the planning horizon to
avoid future leaching.
The optimal crop rotation, presented as an average crop rotation over the
entire planning horizon, varies with an increase in the water treatment cost
as shown in Table 2. An increase in the water treatment costs leads to a sub-
stitution of conventionally tilled maize by maize cultivated with a cover crop,
and of conventionally tilled winter wheat by winter wheat cultivated with
minimum tillage.
With respect to the use of nitrogen fertiliser, we can observe in Figure 2a
that the introduction of water treatment costs leads initially to a sharp decrease
in the average fertiliser use over the entire planning horizon. Although it con-
tinues thereafter, it is far less pronounced, and it nearly comes to a complete
stop for water treatment costs of 0.6 Rappen. Figure 2b shows the development
of the nitrate concentration of the groundwater over the entire planning
horizon. Although the nitrate concentration decreases with an increase in
water treatment costs, the target value of 25 mg/l cannot be achieved even
with water treatment costs of 1 Rappen. Further calculations, not presented
here, show that the target value can only be achieved if part of the land is
retired from production.
5.2. Tax on nitrogen
As an alternative to the water treatment policy, the regulator may wish to apply
a tax on nitrogen. In contrast to the previous policy, it aims for an on-site rather
Table 2. Average crop rotation plan over time for different water treatment costs
(in hectares per type of land-use)
Type of land-use Water treatment costs (Rappen) per mg/l NO3
2
and m3 of water
0 0.2 0.36 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Maize (conventional tillage,
mineral fertiliser)
6.0 6.00 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.60
Maize with a cover crop (conventional
tillage, organic fertiliser)
2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.0
Pasture (mineral fertiliser) 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.4
Winter wheat (conventional tillage,
mineral fertiliser)
10.0 10.0
Winter wheat (minimum tillage,
mineral fertiliser)
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
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than an off-site abatement of nitrate. With the introduction of this policy,
policymakers aim to control the intensive margin; however, they are often
unaware that this policy affects the extensive margin as shown in the theoreti-
cal part of the paper. As the objective of the empirical study is not to replicate
Figure 2. (a) Average fertiliser use (kg/ha) over time for different water treatment costs. (b)
Nitrate concentration of the groundwater (mg/l) over time for different water treatment costs.
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exactly the policy instruments discussed in the previous section concerning
‘the economic model’, but to evaluate the relative efficiency of single
versus joint policy instruments, we decided on a tax design that can be
implemented in reality. Thus, in contrast to the input tax proposed in the
previous section, the tax on nitrogen is not crop-specific and is constant
over time. We opted to analyse this particular policy because it is frequently
discussed as a policy option. The following section analyses the effect of
this tax without allowing for the substitution of mineral fertilisers by
organic fertilisers. We assume that no organic fertiliser is available or its
use is restricted by law7 and, hence, the tax is applied only to the nitrogen
content of mineral fertiliser.
Additionally, we assume that there are no costs to public funds. This means
that every Swiss Franc raised by the government will be fully returned to
society.8 Hence, social net benefits are the net benefits of farming plus tax
payments. We need to add the tax payments as they are a pure transfer that
does not affect overall welfare. The results of our calculations are summarised
in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that the sum of the farm’s discounted net benefits over
30 years fall from 704,000 CHF with no fertiliser tax to 606,000 CHF for a
nitrogen tax that increases the fertiliser price by 200 per cent. Consequently,
the farm’s average net benefits from farming over 30 years fall from
1174 CHF to 11742 163.3 ¼ 1006.7 CHF per ha. This reduction in net
benefits goes together with a decrease in the average NO3
2 concentration in
the groundwater over 30 years from 46 mg/l to 462 9.6 ¼ 36.4 mg/l.
Abatement costs and tax payments, however, rise from zero to approximately
17 CHF per mg/l NO3
2 with the introduction of the lowest tax rate of 40 per
cent. Additional tax increases do not substantially change abatement costs and
tax payments per NO3
2 mg/l. The results show that the sum of abatement costs
and tax payments grows more or less proportionally to the reduction in nitrate
emissions. Finally, Table 3 indicates that the terminal state of the nitrogen pool
decreases with the introduction of the nitrogen tax. With respect to the average
crop rotation over the entire planning horizon, we can conclude from Table 4
that the average crop rotation is insensitive to successive increases in the
nitrogen tax.
7 In a different optimisation run, we allowed for the substitution of mineral fertilisers by organic
fertiliser. As one would expect, the imposition of a tax on the nitrogen content of mineral fertiliser
does not result in a reduction in nitrate emissions as the cutback in the use of mineral fertiliser is
nearly completely compensated by an increase in organic fertiliser. Hence, one needs to restrict
the use of organic fertiliser. For the case studied here, the restriction with respect to organic fer-
tiliser corresponds to the amount of organic fertiliser prior to the introduction of the tax.
8 We are aware of the fact that our assumption with respect to the costs of public funds is not
correct. However, according to a recent study for OECD countries the costs of public funds for
Switzerland are, compared with those for other OECD countries, very low (14 per cent), and
thus we decided not to incorporate them (Jacobsen Kleven and Thustrup Kreiner, 2003).
Moreover, the cost of public funds is not particularly important for our study, as we compare
different instruments and the omission of these costs affects the policy instruments equally per
unit of currency spent.
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Table 3. Outcomes in the case of an N-input tax
Outcome Input tax on the nitrogen content of mineral fertiliser
0% 40% 80% 120% 145% 160% 200%
Sum of the farm’s net benefits over 30 years
(in 1,000 CHF/20 ha)
704 678 655 635 627 621 606
Changes in the average farm’s net benefits of farming
in CHF/ha (1,174 CHF/ha with no abatement costs
and tax payments)a
0 243.0 281.1 2115.5 2128.4 2138.4 2163.3
(0%) (23.4%) (26.9%) (29.8%) (210.9) (211.8%) (213.9%)
Average tax payments (CHF/ha) 0 41.0 71.1 93.0 99.6 104.9 117.8
Changes in the average NO3 concentration in the
groundwater in mg/l (46 mg/l with no abatement
costs and tax payments)a
0 22.4 24.7 26.9 28.5 28.9 29.6
(0%) (25.2%) (210.2%) (215%) (218.5%) (219.3%) (220.9%)
Average abatement costs and tax payments in
CHF per NO3
2 mg/la
17.9 17.2 16.7 15.1 15.6 17.0
Changes in the nitrogen pool in final year of the
planning horizon in g/tons (g/ton of soil) with
respect to initial value of 8,364 g/ton
2136 2212 2289 2351 2408 2433 2496
aThe stated values are the average values over the entire planning horizon of 30 years.
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Figure 3a shows that the average amount of fertiliser over the entire plan-
ning horizon decreases from approximately 110 kg/ha to 58 kg/ha with the
introduction of the nitrogen tax. Finally, Figure 3b demonstrates the develop-
ment of the nitrate concentration of the groundwater over time given a nitro-
gen tax of 40 per cent and one of 200 per cent.
The introduction of water treatment costs of 0.36 CHF reduces the average
nitrate concentration in the groundwater by 8.5 mg/l. As a consequence, the
average social net benefits of farming per hectare decrease by 144.3 CHF.
The same reduction in the average nitrate concentration in the groundwater
can be achieved by an N-tax of 145 per cent, which is accompanied by a
decrease in the farm net benefit of 128.4 CHF. Thus, off-site abatement or
ex post remediation in the form of water treatment is far less cost-efficient
than on-site abatement or ex ante prevention in the form of an N-tax.
Moreover, when subtracting the water treatment cost of 105.7 CHF and the
tax payments of 99.6 CHF per hectare from the corresponding social or
farm net benefits, we obtain the farmer’s abatement cost for each policy.
These calculations show that the farmer’s average abatement costs per
hectare of 144.32 105.7 ¼ 38.6 CHF for water treatment are clearly
higher than the farmer’s average abatement costs of an N-tax, given by
128.42 99.6 ¼ 28.8 CHF.
5.3. Land-use tax and N-tax
As an alternative to a tax on the nitrogen content of mineral fertiliser, land-use
taxes have been proposed (Pan and Hodge, 1994). In contrast to a tax on
mineral fertiliser, land-use taxes could be spatially differentiated, i.e. targeted
according to the characteristics of each location. Moreover, the tax base of
land-use taxes can be easily observed as its elements consist in the cultivated
crop, the location of the crop, and the cultivation technique employed.
However, land-use taxes only control the extensive margin and not the
intensive margin. Thus, an increase in the amount of applied fertiliser could
Table 4. Average crop rotation plan (hectares per type of land-use) over time for the
case of a tax on the nitrogen content of mineral fertiliser with no substitution by organic
fertiliser
Type of land-use Tax on the nitrogen content of mineral fertiliser
0 40% 80% 120% 145% 160% 200%
Maize (conventional tillage,
mineral fertiliser)
6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Pasture (mineral fertiliser) 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Winter wheat (conventional tillage,
mineral fertiliser)
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
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be expected if land-use taxes were implemented. The results of our
calculations with spatially non-differentiated land-use taxes confirm this
conjecture. The average use of mineral fertiliser increased from 103 to
113 kg/ha, and the average nitrate concentration in groundwater rose from
46 to nearly 48 mg/l. Because of these results, spatially non-differentiated
land-use taxes alone were not considered for the comparison of second-best
policies in the empirical part of the paper.
Figure 3. (a) Average fertiliser use over time for different nitrogen taxes. (b) Nitrate
concentration of the groundwater over time with an input tax of 0, 40, and 200 per cent.
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To control the intensive and extensive margin at the same time, we propose
to combine land-use taxes with a nitrogen tax on mineral fertiliser. As our
model does not allow for spatial differentiation, we considered only non-
spatially differentiated instruments. To determine these two taxes, we initially
defined a restriction that produces an average reduction in the NO3 concen-
tration in groundwater (8.5 mg/l). Thereafter, the resulting amount of
mineral fertiliser and the resulting crop rotation were formulated as restric-
tions in a subsequent optimisation of the economic model. These restrictions
produced shadow prices that establish the tax on the nitrogen content of
mineral fertiliser and on land-use. In the case where the restriction on land-
use is not binding, the inequality sign of the restriction is reversed, to
produce a shadow price that establishes the corresponding land-use subsidy.
The results of our optimisations are presented in Table 5.
The combination of land-use and nitrogen taxes leads to a decrease in the
average nitrate concentration of 8.5 mg/l in the groundwater, and to a reduction
in the average farm net benefits per hectare of 100.7 CHF. Subtracting the
average tax/subsidy payments of 76.2 CHF per hectare from the corresponding
farm net benefits, we obtain abatement costs of 24.5 CHF per hectare. Hence, the
combination of land-use and nitrogen taxes leads to a decrease in the abatement
costs of 4.3 CHF per hectare in comparison with an N-tax alone.
The resulting crop rotation plan, presented in Table 6, shows that the maize
cultivation activity has to be reduced (land-use tax) and the activity of growing
maize with a cover crop has to be extended (land-use subsidy) to replicate the
crop rotation resulting from the optimisation where the concentration of nitrate
in the groundwater is reduced on average by 8.5 mg/l.
Table 5. Outcomes in the case of a combination of a land-use tax and an N-input tax
Outcome No taxes Combined land-use
and N-input taxes
Sum of the farm’s net benefits of farming over 30 years
(in 1,000 CHF/20 ha)
704 644
Changes in the average farm’s net benefits of farming
in CHF/ha (1,174 CHF/ha
with no abatement and damage costs)a
2100.7
Average tax payments 76.2
Changes in the average NO3
2 concentration in the
groundwater in mg/l (46 mg/l with no abatement
and damage costs)
28.5
(218.5%)
Average abatement and tax payments in CHF
per NO3
2 mg/la
11.9
Changes in the nitrogen pool in the final year of the
planning horizon in g/ton of soil with respect to the
initial value of 8364 g/ton
259 21063
aThe stated values are the average values over the entire planning horizon of 30 years.
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6. Summary and conclusions
The current literature on second-best policies for regulating pollution has paid
little attention to the effect that regulation of the intensive margin has upon the
extensive margin. This article shows that regulation of the intensive margin
must be accompanied by regulation of the extensive margin. Whereas the
former is always in the form of a tax, the latter is in the form of either a tax or
a subsidy. It is in the form of a subsidy if the pollution elasticity with respect
to nitrogen fertiliser is greater than one. If the pollution elasticity is less than
one, the regulation of the extensive margin leads to a proper tax. If the pollution
elasticity is equal to one, no regulation at the extensive margin is necessary.
When the pollution elasticity is not known, the curvature of the pollution function
together with information about the background loads allow us to determine
whether the extensive margin should be regulated by a tax or a subsidy.
The economic model used is dynamic not only because nitrate is stored and
released from the nitrogen pool of the soil and finally accumulated at the
aquifer, but also because the choice of crop is modelled as a true decision vari-
able. The results of our empirical study demonstrate that a combination of
input and land-use taxes is about 18 per cent more cost efficient than an
input tax alone and 58 per cent more cost efficient than an off-site abatement
in the form of water treatment.
The introduction of a land-use tax to complement an input tax not only
allows the cost efficiency to be raised, but would also allow a more site-specific
environmental policy to be designed, as the land-use tax could in principle
be observed easily by the regulator. It may be interesting in future research
to evaluate the proposed combination of land-use and input taxes with
respect to site-specific targeting or with respect to transaction, administration,
control, and enforcement costs not considered in this analysis.
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Table 6. Average crop rotation plan over time for the case of a combination of a land-use
tax and an N-input tax
Type of land-use Hectares per
type of land-use
Maize with a cover crop (conventional tillage, organic fertiliser) 2.5
Maize (conventional tillage, organic fertiliser) 3.5
Pasture (mineral fertiliser) 4
Winter wheat (conventional tillage, mineral fertiliser) 10
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Appendix
A1. First-order conditions of the social decision problem
The first-order conditions of the social decision problem yield
Lxij ¼ ð pifijx  aj  cifijxÞ þ lgijx þ
mfijxPI
i
P2
j yij
 ! !
yij  0 ð12Þ
Lyij ¼ ð pifij  ajxij  cifij  kijÞ þ lgij þ
mfijPI
i
P2
j yij
 !
þ mfijðyijðtÞÞ
XI
i
X2
j
yij
 !2
 0 ð13Þ
_s ¼
XI
i¼1
X2
j¼1
gijðxij; nÞyij; sð0Þ ¼ s0 ð14Þ
_n ¼
PI
i¼1
P2
j¼1ðfijðxij; nÞÞyijPI
i¼1
P2
j¼1 yij
; nð0Þ ¼ n0 ð15Þ
_l ¼ dlþ c 0ðsÞ ð16Þ
_m ¼ dm
XI
i
X2
j
ðð pi  ciÞfijnÞyij þ l
XI
i
X2
j
gijnyij
"
þm
PI
i
P2
j fijnyijPI
i
P2
j yij
#
ð17Þ
and the transversality conditions are given by
mðTÞ ¼ edTznðnðTÞ; sðTÞÞ; lðTÞ ¼ edTzsðnðTÞ; sðTÞÞ: ð18Þ
In the case of an interior solution, equation (12) states that the value of
the marginal product of an increase in the application rate of fertiliser should
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equal its marginal cost. The first term in parenthesis captures these values in
terms of market values. As shown in equation (8), l is negative, and therefore
the second term in parenthesis presents the marginal shadow cost of nitrate
leaching. Unfortunately, the sign of m cannot be determined analytically.
However, empirical work shows that, if the nitrogen pool is small, an increase
in the amount of nitrogen will predominantly favour crop growth and not nitro-
gen leaching (Schmid, 2001). On the contrary, if the nitrogen pool is large, an
increase in nitrogen will favour nitrogen leaching and not crop growth. Thus, it
is expected that m is positive if the nitrogen pool is small and negative if the
nitrogen pool is large. Given the changing sign of m, the third term in parenth-
esis either presents the shadow marginal cost or the shadow value of the mar-
ginal product of a change in nitrogen of the nitrogen pool in the soil.
Condition (13) determines the optimal size of the area cultivated with crop i
and fertiliser j. As the Lagrangian function is linear in yij, boundary solutions at
the upper and lower limits of yij are optimal. Equations (14) and (15) already
form part of the original problem and are stated here only for completeness
of the necessary conditions. Equation (16) states that at the optimum the
inter-temporal change of the shadow cost of the nitrate in the groundwater
should be equal to the sumof the interest forgone, if thewater were not polluted,
and the marginal monetary damage. Likewise, equation (17) shows that the
inter-temporal change of the shadow cost of the amount of nitrogen in the nitro-
gen pool in the soil has to be equal to the sum of the interest forgone if the nitro-
gen were not extracted (m. 0) or the interest forgone if the nitrogen were not
applied (m, 0), and of the marginal values of the change in the amount of
nitrogen with respect to production, leaching and the nitrogen pool.
A2. First-order conditions of the private decision problem
The first-order conditions of the social decision problem read as
Lpxij ¼ ð pifijx  aj  cifijxÞ  tij þ
mfijxPI
i
P2
j yij
 !
yij  0 ð19Þ
Lpyij ¼ ð pifij  ajxij  cifij  kijÞ  tijxij  sij
þ mfijPI
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A3. Proof of Proposition 1
According to the mean value theorem for 0, x˜ij , x

ij, we can say that
gijðxij; nÞ  gijð0; nÞ ¼ rijð~xij; nÞ 
xij
n
 
 0
n
  
where the symbolr indicates the gradient of the function gij. Hence, we obtain
that
gijðxij; nÞ  gijð0; nÞ ¼
@gijð~xij; nÞ
@ xij
xij ¼) 1
gijð0; nÞ
gijðxij; nÞ
¼ @gijð~xij; n
Þ
@xij
xij
gijðxij; nÞ
:
If the pollution function is strictly convex, gxx . 0, i.e. gx increases with x, and
replacing x˜ij by x

ij it holds that
1 gijð0; n
Þ
gijðxij; nÞ
,
@gijðxij; nÞ
@xij
xij
gijðxij; nÞ
; 1gijx : ð23Þ
If the leaching function is strictly concave, gxx , 0, or linear, gxx ¼ 0, the
inequality sign in equation (23) is reversed, or replaced by an equality sign,
respectively. According to equation (11), the land-use tax sij is a subsidy
(sij , 0) if 1x
gij . 1. From equation (23) it is clear that this condition is satisfied
if the pollution function is strictly convex in xij, and if gij(0, n
) ¼ 0. Thus, we
have verified part (a) of Proposition 1. According to equation (11), the land-
use tax sij is a tax (sij. 0) if 1x
gij , 1. Equation (23), but with the inequality
sign reversed, shows that this condition is satisfied if the leaching function is
strictly concave in xij. Similarly, one can prove part (c) of Proposition 1.
A4. The hydrological model
For the empirical application of the theoretical model we decided to express
the amount of nitrate in the groundwater in the form of mg/l as this is a stan-
dard measurement unit applied in policy formulation. EPIC considers the
transport and transformation processes of nitrogen from the topsoil to the
groundwater, and supplies the amount of nitrate that reaches the lower soil
layers with the variable PRKN (mineral N loss in the percolate). Moreover,
EPIC calculates the amount of gravitational water that feeds the aquifer as a
function of the different crops. This information, therefore, allows the
nitrate concentration of the gravitational water to be calculated. The hydro-
logical model considered in our economic model is a single-cell aquifer
where the pore volume is completely and homogeneously distributed and
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the water balance is constant. Thus, the amount of gravitational water, which is
considered to be the only source of water that feeds the aquifer, is equal to the
amount of water that is extracted or runs off.9 According to Rohmann and
Sontheimer (1985), these conditions allow us to write the water balance as
wlg^ðcgðtÞ  ceðtÞÞ ¼ wlhnf ðdce=dtÞ
where w, l and h denote the width, length and height of the aquifer in mm, in
that order. The variable gˆ denotes gravitational water in mm per year (1 mm
corresponds to 10,000 l/ha), nf the available pore volume in the aquifer,
and cg and ce the nitrate concentration of the gravitational water (mg/l) and
extracted water (mg/l), respectively. Next, the water balance can be written
in discrete form and resolved for ce(tþ 1), which yields
ceðt þ 1Þ ¼ g^
cg  ceðg^ hnf Þ
hnf
: ð24Þ
EPIC, however, provides nitrate losses in kg/ha and thus the function gij(xij, n)
in equation (2) has to be corrected by the factor 102 to obtain the nitrate
concentration of the aquifer in mg/l.10 Hence equation (2), written in discrete
form and taking into consideration the hydrological model outlined above,
results in
sðt þ 1Þ ¼
X14
i¼1
X2
j¼1
ð102 gijðxijðtÞ; nðt  1ÞÞÞ  ðsðtÞðg^ hnf ÞÞ
hnf
yij
 !
X14
i¼1
X2
j¼1
yijðtÞ ð25Þ
where the nitrate emissions gij(xij(t), n(t2 1)) into the groundwater are
measured in kg per hectare, and the nitrate concentration in the groundwater
s(t) is now measured in mg per litre. Equation (25) can also be written as
sðt þ 1Þ ¼ sðtÞyijP13
i¼1
P2
j¼1 yijðtÞ
 sðtÞg^yij
hnf
P13
i¼1
P2
j¼1 yijðtÞ
þ
X13
i¼1
X2
j¼1
ð102 gijðxijðtÞ; nðt  1ÞÞÞ  ðsðtÞðg^ hnf ÞÞ
hnf
P13
i¼1
P2
j¼1 yijðtÞ
yij ð26Þ
9 Denitrification processes were not considered in our hydrological model as they depend on the
existence of certain organic and inorganic compounds, which are irreversibly broken down in
the process of nitrification. Thus, in the long run there will not be any denitrification (Weingarten,
1996).
10 1 mm of gravitational water per ha (10,000 l) with a concentration of 1 mg/l results in 10 g of
nitrate/ha. Thus, the results of EPIC have to be multiplied by 102 in order to express kg/ha as
mg/l.
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showing that the average concentration of nitrate corresponding to 1 hectare in
the next period is equal to the current average concentration of nitrate per
hectare minus average diluting effect of the gravitational water per hectare
plus the average nitrate emissions from farming per hectare.
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